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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
State of Utah,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

No. 9778

-·--··- ·---

Dennis Sherman Kinder,
Defendant-Appellant.

-------APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATE11ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a criminal action in which
the defendant was charged with robbery
and grand larceny.

Both charges arose

out of the same occurrence

~mich

took

place on October 30, 1961, at the Al
Harris Dairy Milk Depot in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT
The case

\•Tas

tried to a jury.

From
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a vereict and jugment of guilty of rob-

bery and grand larceny, defendant
appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks reversal of
the judgment and a new trial.

STATENENT OF FACTS
On October 30, 1961, at about 8
P.M. an armed robber entered the Al Harris
Dairy Hilk Depot in Salt Lake City) Utah,
and robbed Daniel L. Kelly, an employee,
of $156.83 *

The money belonged to the

dairy company and was taken from the cash
register.

The robber wore a red bandana

around the top of his head and had three.
or four days growth of beard on his face.
After he departed, the police

~1ere

and made a routine investigation.

called
During

this investigation, Mr. Kelly identified
a photograph of another person as being
the robber, but later changed his mind
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"

and identified a photograph of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.
During the trial of the case, Mr.
Kelly identified the defendant as the
person who took the money from him.

Upon

cross-examination, however, counsel
brought out that the identification

"~:·vas

somewhat doubtful.
The defendant took the stand at
the trial and testified that he was in
Arizona at the time the crime was committed.
On crone-examination, the prosecutor 1\•Jas
permitted, over oounsel 1 s .objections, to
bring out certain testimony about facts
vJhich vJere not mentioned on direct examation.

This testimony was about a 195.5

Ford pick-up truck in 1V'7hich the defendant
drove to Arizona.
allo~d

The prosecutor was

to elicit facts about where the

defendant obtained the truck and about
certain changes that he made in the truck
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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before he left for Arizona.

The State

was later allowed by the court to show
that the defendant had previously told a
policeman a different story abcut the
truck than what he told in court on the
day of the trial.

After the crime was commit ted, the
witness, Daniel Kelly)' who vJas on parole
from the Utah State Prison,

v1as

returned

to the prison for parole violation.

~~~Jhen

the defendant was convicted, he was committed to the Utah State Prison for punishment.

After he arrived at the prison,

he talked to Mr. Kelly about the case and
obtained an affidavit from him to the
effect that the defendant was not the
pen::·1 v1ho had robbed him.

He also

obtained an affidavit from Charles Glenis
Anderson, another prisoner, who

S"~;·Jears

therein that Daniel Kelly told him the
person

WQO

committed the crime had paid

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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him to testify at the trial.
ARGilliJENT

Point l.

SINCE THE TRIAL OF THE CASE,

THE DEFENDANT HAS DISCOVERED NEl.Y EVIDENCE
\ffiiCH IS lliATERIAL TO HIS C11SE AND TO THE
COURT AND UHICH HE COULD NOT, \rJI'IHOUT
REASONABLE DILIGENCE, HAVE DISCOVERED
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL OR PRODUCED AT THE

TIME OF THE TRIAL.
After the defendant v1as commit ted to
the Utah State Prison for punishment, he
talked to the witness, Daniel Kelly, vJho
had been returned to the prison for parole
violation between the time of the alleged
robbery and the trial of the case.

After

discussing the matter with Mr. Kelly, he
obtained an affidavit tmich has been
filed with the court in the above matter.
The affidavit reads as follows:

"County of Salt Lake)

• ss

State of Utah

)

Comew now, DANIEL
KELLY, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
That I, DANIEL KELLY,
of my O'{,o70 free will and so that the
whole truth shall be made known to
all concerned, do hereby certify in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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this affidavit that the testomony
I heretofore gave on my sworn oath
to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth in and
at the trial of DENNIS KINDER, the
said DEm~IS KINDER then and there
being tried in court for the crime
of robbing the AL HARRIS DAIRY
located at Salt Lake City, in the
State of Utah, said trial being
had on the 13th day of June, 1962,
v1as erroneous in that I, DANIEL
IffiLLY, did mistakenly identify
DENNIS KINDER as the person 't\lho
robbed me at the time of the said
robbery and I have since found
out to my ot-7n satisfaction that
Dffi~NIS KINDER, who was convicted
of robbing me, was not the person
who did rob me and of the fact
DENNIS KINDER did not rob me I
am now certain and, to this fact
I do now swear without fear of
perjuring myself; and, further:
in regards to my previous trial
testimony identifying DENNIS
KINDER as being the person who
robbed me, I then so testified
that he could have been the
person but I did not testify that
he was the person and that he did
not rob me I now know beyond a
reasonable doubt; and, therefore,
this affidavit is made to clear
DENNIS KINDER of any connection
Whatsoever with the crime for
which he· was charged, tried and
convicted; and, wherefore, I,
DANIEL KELLY, now state that I
am only sorry that I was forced
to testify at DENNIS KINDER'S
trial, but I had no choice under
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the circwnstances I found myself
facing at that particular time.

lsi Daniel Kelly
DA1f:fEL-KE"LtY--J[friat1f
'

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 24th day of August, 1962.

60{J{mruBi~~-h~'?_OE._
Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
:My Cornmission E}'pires:
September 20, 1S'63"
Toe defendant also obtained an affidavit from Charles Glenis Anderson)
another prisoner, and this affidavit
has also been filed with the court.

It

reads as follows:
"County of Salt Lake)
. ss
State of Utah
)
Comes no'tv, CHARLES
GLENIS ANDERSON, being first duly
sworn, deposes and says:
That I , CHARLES
GLENIS ANDERSON, of my own free
will and so that the vmole truth
shall be made kno't,m to all concerned, do hereby certify in this
affidavit that DANIEL L. KELLY
did personally and voluntarily
admit to me and tell me that DE~miS
KINDER w·as innocent of the robbery
of the L'1L I-:rt~RRIS HILK DEPOT located

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in Salt Lake City, in the State
of Utah, and that he, DANIEL I<ELLY,
w~s ~lid to testif¥ at the ~trial
of Dii:NNlS K:r'NDER by some person
or persons not made known to me,
and further, DANIEL L. KELLY did
state to me that the aforesaid
person or persons who had paid
him to so testify was or were
guilty of robbing the AL HARRIS
MILK DEPOT and not DENNIS KINDER.

Ls/

Charles G. Anderson

CH.ARLlt'S"GLENISANDERSON
Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 24th day of August, 1962.

Ls/

James. irJ. Johnson
NOTARY PUBLIC
Salt Lake County
State of Utah
My Commission Expires:
September 20, 1963"
From past Utah Supreme Court decisions
it appears that both of the following
requirements must be met before newly
discovered evidence can be grounds for a
new trial:
1.

The evidence could not with

reasonable diligence have been discovered
and produced at the trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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77-38-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
State vs. ~-Jeaver, 78 U. 515, 6 P.2d
167.

State vs. MaDre, 41 U. 247, 126 P.
322.

State vs. Ha~Jkins, 81 U. 16, 16
P.2d 13.
State vs. Uilliams, l:.9 U. 336,
16L:. P. 253.

2.

Tne evidence must be of such a

character or import as to justify a conelusion that upon a

ne~·:r

trial the jury

vJou1d bring a verdict which is different
from the one thnt was rendered at the
first trial.
State vs.
193 P. 815.
State vs.
P. 748.
State vs.
167.
State vs.
p .2d 764-.

State vs.
13.

£i!on t gomery, 37

~.vhich

515,

u. 525, 122
\t.Jeaver, 78 u. 515, 6 P.2d
Cooper, llL} u. 531, 201
Hawkins, 81 u. 16, 16 P.2d
Sirmay, 40

It is obvious
under

u.

f~com

the circumstances

tbe affidavits were obtained

that they were unavailable until after
the trial of the case.

After his convic-

tion, the defendant was committed to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Utah State Prison for punishment.

vfuen he

arrived there, he found that Mr. Daniel
Kelly, the robbery victim and identifying
witness for the prosecution, had been
returned to the prison for parole violation bet'tveen the time of the robbery and
the time of the trial.

The defendant

did not become acquainted with the other
\vitness, C:'.1arles Gle.nis Anderson, until
he arrived at the prison.

Therefore, the

evidence brought forth in this case was
not available to the defendant until after
the trial and satisfies the first requirement listed above.
In regards to the second requirement,
the content of both affidavits tend to
change, discredit and repudiate the most
important testimony at the trial--the
identification of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime.

The testimony

of Daniel Kelly (transcript, page 14,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lines 7, 8) indicates that he and the
robber

~·1ere

a lone in the store at the

time that the robbery took place.

There

were no other witnesses to the occurrence
and the State's case was based almost
entirely on the identification of the
defendant by Mr. Kelly.

Any change in

that testimony in a subsequent trial of
this case would certainly lead to an
opposite verdict by the jury.

In fact,

without such identification, it appears
that the court would dismiss the case
after the State had presented its
evidence.
·The Supreme Court of Utah has considered at least two previous cases in
~mich

the principal witnesses to the

identity of the defendant have stated in
affidavits that they v7ere mistaken in the
identity of the accused and that

they~

w·ere convinced that another person was
guilty of the crime charged.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See State vs. Edmunds, 27 U. 1, 73 P.
886, and State vs. King, 27

1045.

u.

6, 73 P.

In both of these cases, the appel-

lant court reversed the decisions of the
trial court for its failure to
new trial.

~rant

a

By these cases the court has

declared that where the witness admits
that he 't•Jas mistaken and that the identification was wrongful, then a new trial
should be granted.

The

discove~J

of

new evidence in our caoe makes it neeessary for the court to set aside the
verdict of the jury and to grant a net·7
trial in this matter.
Point 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
PERf1ITTING 'IHE PROSECUTION TO CROSS-EX.AHINE
THE DEFENDANT REGARDING I:-1ATTERS HHICH t~lERE
NOT BROUG'dT OUT ON DIRECT EXAMINATION.

The evidence brought out by the
prosecution on cross-examination was
improper for
1.

t~vo

reasons:

It was irrelevant because it

tended to sholv evidence that the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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had stolen the truck in Which he
had driven to Arizona.

This was

a crime for which he had not been
charged and for

~mich

he was not

being tried.
2.

The questions posed by the

prooecut~r

were outside the

sco~e

of proper cross-examination and
should have been excluded by the
court.
As a preliminary to the dis-

cussion of these two allegations
it should be pointed out that the
testimony of the defendant on direct
examination was carefully limited
to the facts and circumstances Which
established hisWhereabouts at the
time

the robbery occurred.

They.

refer exclusively to his alibi.
On cross-examination the prosecutor

was allowed to cross-examine the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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defendant about a 1955 Ford pickup truck which he drove to Arizona.
He was subsequently allowed to
question him about Where he
acquired the truck (page 40, lines
16-27), the colors of the truck
(page 46, line 23 to Page 47, line
9), how he painted the truck (page
47, lines 10-30) and about an unrelated conversation with.a policeman about the truck (page 50,
lines 11-17).

On rebuttal, the

court permitted the prosecutor to
call as a witness a police officer
to contradict the defendant's testimony and to testify about a conversation

~roich

he had with the

defendant regarding where he had
acquired the truck (page 60, line
3 to page 62, line 3) and how he
had painted the vehicle (page 62,
lines 1-6).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Now let us turn our attention
to the question of Whether or Dot
the evidence Which the prosecutor
brought out on cross-examination
was relevant to the issues.
When one reads the testimony of
officer Donald Lyman (pages 59-63)
regarding his interrogation of the
defendant about the 1955 Ford pickup truck, it becomes obvious that
the truck was stolen by the accused a day or two before the
robbe~J.

This must have been

even more obvious to the jury at
the trial.

This was a direct

(successful) attempt on the part
of the prosecution to bring in evidence to show that the defendant
had committed another crime--that
of stealing an automobile--prior
to and apart from the crime for
Which he was being charged.

In

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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allowing the prosecution to bring
~uch

evidence to the attention of

the jury, the judge comrni t ted
prejudicial error.

A summary of

the law in this field is set forth
in 1 Jones on Evidence 290, 5th
Edition, 1958, Section 162 on
Relevancy.

The text thereof is

as follo'tt7S:
"CRllviES OTHER THAN OFFENSE
CHARGES.--Peculiarly applicable to criminal cases is
the rule tvhich prohibits
the introduction of evidence
of other wholly independent
offenses as the basis for
an inference that the defendant is guilty of the offense
for which he is being tried.
Otherwise stated, it is not
proper to show by proof of
previous bad conduct that
he has a propensity for committing crime, and because
he committed other crimes on
previous occasions he probably
committed the crime in
question."
"Although it has been
treated as a rule of relevancy,
and is here so classified,
the rule is recognized, not
because the evidence of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided byis
the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
previous
offenses
irreleLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vant, but for other more
plausible reasons. One
basic reason for the rule
is that such evidence is
apt to be given too much
weight, rather than too
little, by the jury, thus
resulting in the conviction of a defendant
because he is a bad man
and not because of his
specific guilt of the
offense with which he is
charged."
"It is a sound rule of
public policy and therefore
exclusionary in the sense
that it keeps out relevant
evidence for justifiable
reasons. Besides the
highly prejudicial character
of such evidence there are
the considerations that a
defendant is entitled to
be tried only for the crime
charged against him, that
he is entitled to notice
and the right to prepare
his defense to any charges
brought against him free
from surprise, that the
evidence of collateral
crimes would tend to confuse the jury and divert
them from the real issues,
that bad character cannot
be proved by evidence of
specific acts, and that the
state is not entitled to
attack the character of the
accused until he has offered
evidence of his good character."
-17-
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The Utah Supreme Court has
followed this view.

The rule set

forth by the cases is that evidence of other crimes is not
admissible unless such evidence
has probative value towards
proving a material issue.

See

State vs. Torgerson, 4 U.2d 52,
286 P.2d 800.

In a concurring opinion
written by Justice Lester A. Wade
in the case of State vs. Winget,
6 U.2d 243, 310 P.2d 738, there

appears a very comprehensive and
instructive outline of the laws
of the State of Utah in regards to
the question of relevancy.

It is

stated as follows:
"The following is a brief
review of the rules above
referred to: Except tmere
otherwise provided by Rules
of Evidence all relevant
evidence is admissible.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Relevant evidence means evidence having a tendency in
reason to p~ove or disprove
any material facts in issue.
However, evidence that a
person committed a crime
upon one occasion is inadmissible to prove his disposition, bad character,
or propensity to commit
crime as the basis for an
inference that he committed the crime for which he
is on trial, but such evidence v1hen relevant is
admissible to prove some
other material facts including the absence of mistake
or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge or identity.
The reason for e:>ccluding
such evidence is that the
danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value
of such evidence. This is
said to be an application
of the rule against the
initial introduction of
evidence of bad character
by the prosecution. However, it is generally
recognized that the judge
may in his discretion exclude such evidence if he
finds that its probative
value is substantially
outweighed by the risk that
the admission will cause
undue consumption of time,
create substantial danger
of undue prejudice or of
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confusing the issues or
misleading the jury or
unfairly and harmfully
surprise the defendant
who has not had reasonable opportunity to
anticipate that such
evidence would be offered."
An earlier Utah case Which
follows this doctrine is State vs.
Williams, 36 U 273, 103 P 250.

In

that case the court reversed the
verdict of the jury and stated
that the evidence

allo~"Jed

by the

judge was absolutely inadmissible.
The court explained that where a
defendant is on trial for a particular crime, evidence that he on
some other occasion had committed
a separate and distinct crime
wholly disconnected from the crime
charged in the indictment is never
admissible unless there is some
logical connection between the two
from Which it can be said that
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proof of one tends to establish
the. other.
In summary on this point,
'tt.Te

\~auld

1 ike to quote from the

case of State vs. Dixon, 12 U.2d
8, 361 P.2d

l~l2.

This is the

last case to be decided by the
Utah Supreme Court on this
question.

In this case the

court said:
"It is the sound and
salutary policy of
the law to indulge
everyone, including in
convicted felons, with
the presumption of
inoocence, and to require
the State to obtain and
present sufficient and
creditible evidence to
convince the. jury of the
defendant's g.uil t of the
crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. If
this were not so, serious
and perhaps insuperable
obstacles to reformation
and rehabilitation would
exist for a man who once
acquired a bad reputation."
In allowing the prosecution
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to bring in evidence Which tended
to establish that the defendant
had committed another crime which
was separate and apart from the
crime charged in the information,
the trial court committed prejudicial error and the verdict of the
jury should be set aside and the
case remanded to the District
Court for a

ne~v

trial.

Now let us consider the
allegation that the questions
posed by the prosecutor were
outside the scope of proper
cross-examination.

This allega-

tion involves the same or similar
evidence as that referred to in
allegation number l.
In Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
77-44-2, we find the following:

"RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL
APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL
CASES--EXCEPTIONS. --The
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rules of evidence in civil
actions shall be applicable
also to criminal actions,
except as otherwise provided
in this Code."
In Section 77-44-5, the Utah
law further states as follows:
''ilROS.J-EXAMINATrON OF

TO
TESTIFY NOT TO PREJUDICE.-If a defendant offers himself as a witness, he may be
cross-examined by the counsel
for the state the same as
any other witness-.~"His~
neglecl-or ··refusal to be a
witness shall not in any
manner prejudice him or be
used against him on the
trial or proceeding."
DEFEND~NT--FAILURE

In the case of State vs.
N u r ph y , 9 2 U. 3 8 2 , 6 8 P • 2d 181 , the

Utah court stated the law regarding
the scope of cross-examination of
witnesses as follows:
"Under this section, ( 77-l}4-2) the acope of cross-examination of witnesses in
criminal actions would be
governed by the same rules
as apply in civil actions.tt
Under Rule 43(b) of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adversary party only upon the
subject matter of his examination
in chief.

However, this principle

of law was not inaugurated with the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This practice was followed by many
cases prior to the adoption of
these rules.

See the following

cases:
Bl:.,

State vs. Johnson, 76 U.
287 P.. 9 09 •
State vs. Williams, 36 U.

273, 103 P. 250.

State vs. Vance, 38 U. 1,
110 p •. 434.
State vs. Thorne, 39 U.208,
117 P. 58.
The aforementioned ca.se of
State vs. Vance deserves particular attention by the court because
the issue tvas similar to the one
in the instant

case~

In that

matter the defendant was charged
-24-
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and convicted of murdering his wife
by be.a ting and poi.soning.

The

court reversed the verdict of the
jury because it held that any
cross-examination of the defendant
about the beating was held improper 'men the defendant denied
that he had poisoned his wife.
The court said:
"But -vmere, as in the case
at bar, the witness li~its
his statements to ne~ativ
ing or explaining me~e
issolated facts, or merely
states -vmat occurred at a
particular time and place,
then vJha t took place at
such time and place ordinarily constitutes the subject matter upon ~vhich the
witness testified, and the
cross-examination should be
limited to that subject."
In the case of State vs.
Bleazard, 103 U. 113, 133 P.2d
1000, which was decided in 19t:.3,
the court again said that crossexamination is limited in scope
-25-
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by matters brought out on direct
examination and the like.
In an early civil case, the
court seems to expound the same
doctrine.

The following state-

ment is tound in the case of
Jensen vs. S. H. Kress & Company,
87 U. 434, 49 P.2d 958, which

was decided in 1935.
"Cr.oss-examination is the
detective of the courtroom •• It may be used to
examine as to the credibility of the witness as
a vehicle for transmitting
the testimony, granted it
is not too remote or the
law of diminishing return
from such cross-examination
has not set in. But in
every case it must either
tend to modify, contradict,
explain, deny or elaborate
testimony of the "I"Jitness in
chief, or something which
has been previously brought
out on corss-examination,
which itself was proper
cross-exarnina t ion."
The above cases and many others are
carefully discussed and the Utah
-26-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rule on cross-examination is
adequately stated in an excellent
article by Ronan E. Degnan which
is entitled "Non-Rules Evidence
Lav.J: Cross-Examination."

This

article is found in 6 Utah La-;.;1
Revic't=l 323.
Since the adoption of the
new ru.l:.es of evidence., the law
has been crystalized in this
field.

It is clear that the

cross-exa~iner,

even in criminal

cases, cannot go beyond the
subject matter testified to on
direct.

In a broader sense, the

cross-examiner may bring out anything whicb tends to modify, con~

.¥

tradict,·

~xplain,

deny or elaborate

the testimony of the witness in
chief.

In the case now before the

court, the evidence as to where the
-27Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant had obtained the pick-up
truck in \11hich he drove to Arizona
does not fall into any of these
catagories.

It is obvious that

this te.s t imony 'ttJas nevJ, different and apart from that brought
out on direct examination.

This

was very damaging to the defendant's case.

TI1e only possible

explanation for such evidence
could be that the prosecution
lllas trying to impeach or discredit the witness.

Even under

that theory, the testimony was
too extensive and the questions
too broad.

In 98 C. J. S. 351,

Section

on ::.-!itnesses, the la'\iv

l.~7L:.

on impeachment is stated as follows:
"TO II.JPEACH OR DISCREDIT

party has the
right to introduce evidence directly attacking
the credibility of the
witness for his adversary;

\~~JITNESS-1\

-28-
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~_>..t
~y;·

ordinarily a vJitness
bot be impeached on
collateral matters not
relevant to the issues
to be tried."
CONCLUSION

The defendant should be
granted a new trial for two
reasons.

First, since the trial

of the case the defendant has
discovered new

e~taence

material to his case.

which is
Second,

the evidence that was presented
by prosecution to the jury on
cross-examination of the defendantand through his rebuttal
witness 'ljJas improper and prejudicial.
i.lE,S PECTFULLY SUBr11 TTED,
BARTON

/~ND

ICLEi:M
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